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Writings on the Wall: What the US Elections 
Mean for International Climate Policy 
in  brief   
1. National US Climate Policy and Potential Consequences of the Election of  
 Donald Trump
After an attempt to introduce comprehensive climate change legislation had failed in 2009, Pres-
ident Obama pursued a climate strategy primarily based on the President’s executive powers. US 
climate policies rest to a large extent on old legislation. One major building block is the Clean Air 
Act originally adopted already in 1963 and substantially revised for the last time in 1990. 
Background
On 8 November 2016, Donald Trump was elected to become the 45th President of the 
United States of America. After his election serious questions need to be asked with 
respect to the United States’ future national and international climate policy. 
In his campaign, Trump repeatedly expressed his intention to “cancel the Paris 
Agreement”. What is more, Trump’s election was accompanied by a victory of the 
Republican Party in the House and Senate of the US Congress. A vast number 
of Republicans rejects ambitious climate policies and some even negate the existence 
of anthropogenic climate change. This in brief addresses the question how e ective 
international climate policy can and should continue. How can the course set with the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement be continued independent from the developments 
in the US? This paper sketches possible consequences of the sea change of US climate 
policy for the international negotiation process and identifi es options for a 
“Trump-resilient” way forward. 
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Relying on his executive powers, the Obama administration was able to circumvent the congressional 
gridlock, but the relatively week legal status of his measures together with the strong majority of the 
Republican Party in Congress will make it relatively easy for President-elect Trump to roll-back climate 
policies at national level. 
On the other hand, Trump’s stance on energy policy is not very clear yet. During his campaign, Trump 
promised a renaissance of the US coal industry. The decline of the domestic coal industry, however, is 
only partially driven by climate policy. Coal simply is no longer competitive against natural gas that 
has become abundantly available due to the “fracking” or shale gas boom. Trump himself also promised 
to continue support for the US gas industry, which should further cement the competitive advantage of 
natural gas over coal.
It is also highly questionable whether President Trump could reverse the support for renewable ener-
gies. Corresponding tax credits for wind and solar power were agreed with strong bipartisan support in 
2015. Moreover, there is strong interest in continued investments in renewable energies at the state 
level, motivated in part by considerations of regional economic development as well as the continuous 
decrease of costs of wind and solar power.
Also, the Trump administration will not have much infl uence on state legislation. Many states in the US 
including California and some states on the East coast have rather progressive legislation. In fact, it may 
well be the case that progressive states will expand their climate policy in the absence of ambitious 
federal policies, as was the case during the Presidency of George W. Bush. California’s Governor Jer-
ry Brown, for example, stated immediately after the election that the assumption of o  ce by Donald 
Trump would not prevent California from addressing climate change as the existential threat that it is.
Furthermore, President Trump will not be able to reverse the trend of decreasing prices and tech-
nological advancements made in renewable energy technologies and battery storage. These develop-
ments are already today driven by the world markets and have been robust for years. Prices for solar and 
wind power will continue to decrease and will outcompete both coal and gas also in the United States in 
the foreseeable future.
Still, a reversal of US energy policy and a return to oil, gas and coal as a matter of priority would cer-
tainly decelerate the decline of energy-related emissions in the US. As a result, cumulative emis-
sions would grow, and cumulative emissions are what ultimately counts in the global climate system. 
Moreover, such a roll-back of energy policy would increase carbon lock-in in the United States: it would 
further entrench existing and create new path dependencies that will be di  cult to overcome during a 
later transformation toward a sustainable energy system based on renewable energy. Last but not least, 
the election of Donald Trump may lead to a deterioration of the working atmosphere for national and 
international NGOs as well as other civil society organisations. 
2. The 1.5- or 2°C-Limit in the Light of a U-turn of US Climate Policy
In their nationally determined contribution (NDC) the United States pledged to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by 26 -28 per cent below 2005 levels by 2025. In 2013, US emissions had already 
decreased by slightly more than 9 per cent. Without any climate policy measures, emissions are cur-
rently projected to increase somewhat in the coming years (cf. UNEP DTU, 2016). Even if the Trump 
administration does not dismantle US climate policy entirely, a sizeable burden would fall on the 
global carbon budget. In a scenario in which US emissions do not increase but stabilize at cur-
rent levels and domestic climate action is simply postponed for four years, cumulative emissions 
would add up to 3-3.4 Gigatonnes CO2e until 2025. By comparison, Germany’s annual emissions 
accounted for slightly below one Gigatonne CO2e in 2013. *
* Own calculation based on UNEP DTU (2016). A linear reduction pathway was assumed between 2013 and 2025.
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But what does this mean in terms of global warming? The majority of scenarios considered in the 
IPCC’s most recent assessment report suggest that the 2°C-limit can only be maintained if global 
emissions peak very soon. The later the global emissions trend is reversed, the more likely it is 
that substantial “negative emissions” will be required to limit global warming below 2°C. Such 
negative emissions can be achieved for example through the use of bioenergy in combination 
with technologies to capture and sequester carbon (BECCS). However, both bioenergy use at 
scale as well as CCS are highly contentious on their own. At least from today’s point of view it is 
questionable whether the combination of the two can actually contribute signifi cantly to attain 
the 2°C limit, let alone 1.5°C. The prospects of the Trump Presidency therefore pose a serious 
threat to the global e orts to avoid dangerous climate change.
3. Conditions for a Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
On principle, the United States can withdraw from the international climate treaty, Article 28 of 
the Paris Agreement outlines the modalities. However, it clearly states that any Party can only 
notify its withdrawal three years after the Agreement entered into force for that Party. After the 
notifi cation it would take another year for the withdrawal to take e ect. Ironically, the earliest pos-
sible date at which the US could legally withdraw from the Paris Agreement is 4 November 2020, 
one day after the next regular US presidential election.
A faster way for Trump would be to withdraw not only from the Paris Agreement but also 
from the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). According 
to Article 25.2 of the Convention the United States can declare their withdrawal at any time. The 
decision would take e ect only one year later and would also entail the withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, which is a dependent treaty of the UNFCCC. Whether or not the President can actually 
withdraw from the UNFCCC without consent from the Senate is, however, disputed. In contrast to 
the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC was ratifi ed by the US Senate by an unanimous vote in 1992.
This legal distinction is also important for the more distant future. Any successor to Trump could 
immediately re-ratify the Paris Agreement but not the UNFCCC. Re-entering the UNFCCC would 
require a new ratifi cation process in the US Senate. Given that a 2/3 vote is required for the 
ratifi cation of international treaties, this process would impose a much greater, potentially insur-
mountable, barrier and would probably exclude the US from international climate policy under 
the United Nations for much longer than four years.
It remains to be seen whether or not President-elect Trump will actually keep his campaign prom-
ises. If the US actually terminates international cooperation on climate change, other states may 
stop to cooperate on fi elds which are considered to be more important by President-elect Trump. 
Particularly withdrawing from the UN-FCCC that was negotiated and ratifi ed under the Presidency 
of George H. W. Bush would signify that the US no longer acts in good faith in international nego-
tiations. China, for one, has already strongly discouraged the US from withdrawing from the Paris 
Agreement.
4. Scenarios for the International Climate Negotiations
Trump could actually damage international climate policy most by not withdrawing from the Paris 
Agreement and/or using the four years until the withdrawal takes e ect to block progress on the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement.
Even more important, though, may be the reaction of China, the EU, and other powerful players to 
the end of US climate policy as we knew it. There are three conceivable scenarios:
1. The Paris Agreement falls apart. If the US actually withdraw from the Paris Agreement, 
 other important countries could follow suit. This would most likely result in the Paris 
 Agreement becoming irrelevant before it had the chance to actually take e ect and would 
 most likely end serious multilateral e orts under the auspices of the United Nations.
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2. The Paris Agreement continues as a largely ine ective instrument.
  The adoption of the Paris Agreement was made possible partly by leaving a number of detailed  
  questions to be dealt with at later sessions. This pertains for example to the transparency   
  mechanism. The Agreement does not formulate legally binding obligations for Parties to 
  actually achieve their nationally determined contributions. Instead, Parties are to be disciplined  
  through said transparency mechanism by a ‘naming and shaming’ approach. Under President  
  Obama, the United States had been a promoter of robust transparency rules. Without this   
  leadership, rules, modalities and procedures of the transparency mechanisms may well be 
  watered down to the extent that it becomes di  cult to adequately track progress and to hold  
  accountable those countries that do not implement their NDCs e ectively.
  The implementation of the Paris Agreement could also be held back by a lack of fi nancial    
  means. Donald Trump announced that he would immediately halt any transfers of climate 
  fi nance. Under President Obama, the US had pledged to contribute USD 3 billion to the Green  
  Climate Fund. 500 Million have already been transferred and another 450 million are already  
  budgeted for and chances are that these can be transferred before Donald Trump assumes 
  o  ce. The remainder of the sum, however, will most likely not be paid. Industrialized countries  
  have collectively pledged USD 10.3 billion to the Green Climate Fund as means to support the  
  implementation of the Paris Agreement in developing countries. Without the contribution of 
  the US, the Fund would face a serious capitalization defi cit. In fact, the same issue applies   
  to all other international fi nancial institutions such as the World Bank or the Inter-American 
  Development Bank.
3. Some countries advance cooperation “now more than ever”. The US withdrawing from   
  the Paris Agreement may create some new perspectives for international climate policy. 
  The Paris Agreement and its legal character was tailored to the special circumstances in   
  the United States. It does not create legally binding obligations for countries’ to actually achieve  
  their pledges. This feature allowed President Obama to ratify the Agreement by executive   
  order and without the advice and consent of the Senate. If the US now withdraw from the Paris  
  Agreement, there may be room to strengthen its degree of legal compulsion. A group of 
  ambitious countries could drive the implementation of the Paris Agreement and push for strong  
  transparency and compliance mechanisms. In this scenario, countries would intensify their 
  domestic e orts and increase their fi nancial contributions in order to compensate at least part  
  of the defi cit caused by the prospective retreat of the United States.
There is currently no indication that the fi rst scenario will come to pass. Not one country has 
declared that is going to follow the United States. To the contrary, even traditionally recalcitrant 
countries such as China and Japan have already announced that they will stay true to the Agree-
ment. Australia and others ratifi ed the Agreement in the days after the US election. The resolve to 
carry on is also refl ected in the so-called Marrakech Action Proclamation (MAP) that all countries 
adopted at the recent Marrakech climate conference. In the MAP, Parties restate their commitment 
to the Paris Agreement and its goals and “signal a shift towards a new era of implementation and 
action on climate and sustainable development”. However, Scenario 3 probably also does not have a 
very high likelihood of playing out, although Germany and France have challenged the EU to make 
up for the “loss” of the United States.
The most likely future is therefore that a variant of scenario 2 becomes reality. The Paris Agree-
ment will most likely prevail because at its core it protects and supports the national interests
of its member states. The climate protection contributions are determined nationally and therefore 
refl ect national interests. And increasing numbers of countries are realizing that reducing fossil 
fuel use and transforming their economies is actually in their interest. In particular developing 
countries are moving more and more aggressively on curbing fossil fuel use to reduce the intoler-
able levels of local air pollution and position themselves for future technology markets.
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5. Options for Dealing with the United States 
If a su  cient number of Parties musters the political will to move ahead without or even against 
the US, they have a number of options at their disposal, depending on whether or not the US 
decides to obstruct progress or not. The Paris Agreement could be amended by a three-fourth vote 
of the Parties. However, the rules of procedure of the UNFCCC to date do not allow for majority 
voting. For that reason it is practically impossible to procedurally advance a draft decision to 
the point at which the mentioned decision making rule could actually apply. As long as the United 
States are a Party to the Paris Agreement they could therefore block any amendment from the 
outset.
In addition, while amendments would not need to be ratifi ed by all Parties to enter into force, 
they would be applicable only to those that did ratify. Nonetheless, despite these limitations a 
number of options are feasible:
 
• Further incorporate non-state actors. In recent years there has been a groundswell of   
 transnational climate initiatives and climate action by sub-national entities and non-state   
 actors of all sorts. The Paris Agreement explicitly acknowledges the role of these actors. 
 However, to date there are hardly any avenues for such actors to engage in the inter-
 governmental process. The Paris Agreement could be amended, for example, to enable 
 progressive US states to bypass the federal government and engage directly with the   
 international community, contribute their part to the Paris Agreement and cooperate 
 directly with other (nation) states. If the United States under President Trump decide to   
 just ignore and not actively sabotage the international process, such an amendment 
 might even be agreed upon with the US, since it would not have any direct consequences  
 for the federal level.
• Development of trade measures. If the United States actually withdraw from the Paris 
 Agreement or even the Convention, even more drastic measures may be thought of. 
 As it currently stands, the Paris Agreement does not contain any provisions to deal with   
 non-Parties. In principle, though, it could be amended to create such provisions. The 
 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer provides a precedent: 
 it prohibits trade of ozone depleting substances with countries that are not Parties to the  
 Protocol. 
For climate change so-called carbon border tax adjustments have been discussed. Carbon 
border tax adjustments are tari s that refl ect the embedded emissions of goods and 
services imported from countries with lesser or no climate policies in place. To date, there 
has not been much appetite for such trade measures both because they would have 
adverse e ects on global trade in general and because they would also harm the country 
that imposes them. Nevertheless, Nicolas Sarkozy, former President of France, suggested 
such trade measures. Germany and the European Commission immediately expressed their 
disagreement. This position could change, though, if Donald Trump realizes another of his 
campaign promises: to cancel international trade agreements and to protect US industries 
by imposing tari s on imports inter alia from China and Mexico. If Trump himself incites a 
trade war and confl icts escalate in other policy fi elds, carbon border tax adjustments may 
become a viable political option. 
• A club of frontrunner countries. If e ective climate protection proves to be impossible   
 to organize under the Paris Agreement, more ambitious countries could establish a parallel  
 forum on their own, in which they could cooperate on more advanced climate action. 
 If the US actively blocks the international negotiations under the UNFCCC or countries in   
 response to shifted US priorities only manage to agree on the lowest common denomina-  
 tor, such an alliance of ambitious countries could provide a last resort to advance 
 serious collaboration to combat climate change.
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6. Conclusions
The Paris Agreement was a diplomatic breakthrough. Now, only one year later, the election of Donald 
Trump looms large over the international climate negotiations. Domestically, Trump will not be able 
to halt the transformation of the energy sector for very long; political and technological developments 
are just too advanced. Internationally, the United States have been leader in recent years and the Paris 
Agreement was shaped to a large extent by US positions. Whether or not they will formally withdraw 
from the Agreement or even the Convention remains to be seen. Almost certainly, though, they will 
cease to be a progressive leader. They could even become an obstructionist in the worst case. All 
things considered, it may become impossible to attain the 2°C-limit. 
A lot depends on the reaction of other states. All e orts should be made to keep the United States 
from withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. Other heads of state and government should make 
climate change a top priority and demand that the United States deliver on their commitments. As 
Germany takes over the Presidency of the G20 process in 2017, the German government is in an 
ideal situation to take a leading role.
If, however, the United States is adamant about its withdrawal or even obstruct any progress on the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement, a number of options exist to deal with the situation. 
Collaboration with sub-national authorities and non-state actors in the United States should 
be increased. If possible, they should be incorporated in the UNFCCC process more directly. If 
e ective climate action proves to be impossible within the framework set by the Paris Agreement, an 
alliance of frontrunner countries should move ahead and cooperate in a newly established forum
in parallel to the UNFCCC. To compensate potential competitiveness constraints of such a “minilat-
eral” approach, carbon border tax adjustments could be taken into account. 
The fi rst reactions to the election of Donald Trump indicates that there is an increasing understand-
ing of climate change as a transformation challenge that transcends a mere environmental problem. 
The Paris Agreement provides a promising framework to manage this transformation constructively. 
Losing the United States as a progressive partner does not change the nature of the challenge. 
While the challenge becomes greater if the United States do not reduce their emissions as 
pledged, they will ultimately be left on the wayside and give away their lead on technological and 
economic development.
The authors thank Christiane Beuermann, Hans-Jochen Luhmann, Hermann Ott, Ralf Schüle und 
Stefan Thomas for their invaluable contributions to this paper. 
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